Every individual traveler makes route choices in an inherently uncertain environment, 2 due to random disruptions to the traffic system such as incidents and bad weather, and random 3 behavior of his/her fellow travelers. The premise underlying the development of Advanced 4
INTRODUCTION 1
Every individual traveler makes route choices in an inherently uncertain environment. 2 The sources of uncertainties in a traffic network can be broadly divided into two categories. At 3 one hand, there are unpredictable disturbances to the system that usually result in capacity 4 reductions, such as incidents, vehicle breakdowns, bad weather, special events, and work zones. 5
On the other hand, a more prevalent although probably less disruptive source is his/her fellow 6 travelers' unpredictable behavior, where the collective random individual departure time and 7 route choices result in the random shifting of traffic flows in time and space. 8
A traveler can reduce the uncertainty in his/her decision-making by acquiring more 9 information. The natural source of information is the traveler's own experience, obtained through 10 explorations of alternative routes over a relatively long time period on regular traffic conditions. 11
However personal experience is likely not enough given the large scale of the decision problem, 12 in terms of the number of alternative routes and the myriad of sources of uncertainties. 13
Information beyond personal experience can come from fellow travelers, and more recently, 14 advanced traveler information systems (ATIS) that makes use of the fast developing sensor, 15 telecommunication and computing technologies. Information provided by an ATIS can be 16 divided into three categories: historical, prevailing, and predictive (1) . For example, Google 17
Maps provide archived average traffic conditions by time-of-the-day and day-of-the-week, which 18 could help travelers reduce the uncertainties from unknown alternatives. Google Maps also 19 provides information on prevailing conditions that are useful to travelers who are already 20 familiar with the area and need to know, for example, whether there are constructions on his/her 21 usual route today. Predictive information concerns the traffic conditions in the near future, which 22 have to be calculated by prediction models and not as widely available as the other two types. 23 Prevailing and predictive information could potentially reduce the uncertainties from disruptive 24 disturbances and day-to-day demand fluctuations. 25
In this paper, we focus on the impacts of two types of information, namely the en route 26 real-time information on the occurrence of an incident (prevailing) and the ex post information 27 on foregone payoffs (FPs), which are the travel times on un-chosen alternative routes (historical). 28 We study the impacts at both the individual and system levels. Specially, we are interested in the 29 following three questions: 30 1) How does FP information affect a traveler's route choice learning process? 31 2) Does a traveler make strategic route choices, i.e., planning ahead for real-time 32 information downstream? 33
3) How does real-time information affect the performance of a traffic system subject to 34 random capacity reductions? 35
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related research is reviewed in the next 36 section underlying the contribution of this paper. The methodologies are then presented 37 including the experimental setup and analysis procedures. Preliminary results based on bootstrap 38 statistics are discussed in the following section. Finally we conclude with major findings and 39 future research directions. 40
41

LITERATURE OVERVIEW 42
In this section, we provide a literature overview along the lines of the aforementioned 1 three research questions. The review is limited to empirical research with stated preference (SP), 2 experimental and/or revealed preference (RP) data. Theoretical modeling and simulation studies 3 are out of the scope. 4
Decision makers can learn (over time) from their own experience i.e. feedback 5 information from their actual choices. Experience leads to reinforced learning but, at the same 6 time, it is also a function of sampling available information on the basis of the past experience. 7
Psychologists have been long aware of the "payoff variability effect" which suggests increasing 8 the level of variability in the decision environment inhibits reinforced learning. It occurs when 9 the decision maker receives no specific information describing the possible outcomes of choice 10 and has to rely on feedback from past experience (see e.g., 2). Descriptive information that 11 provides a more complete picture of the decision environment could potentially affect the 12 learning process, however, the resulting behavior varies. Several studies (e.g. 3, 4) assert that 13 travelers will tend to exhibit risk aversion when faced with static pre-trip travel time information. 14 Combining both experiential and descriptive information in the experiment setup, (5,6) have 15
shown that descriptive information expedites travelers' learning but may also encourage them to 16 exhibit risk prone behavior. The exception is the study by ( The literature saw a large body of studies on diversion or compliance under real-time 22
information, e.g., at a variable message sign (VMS). See (9) (10) for two recent reviews on this 23 topic. However, the modeled adaptation behavior is basically reactive -meaning that the 24 traveler's decisions before arriving at a VMS do not consider the fact that the VMS will provide 25 updated traffic conditions in the future. In reality, travelers might decide to acquire information 26 as long as there is a reasonable prospect of reward from it (11). Therefore the fact that a branch 27 of the network has VMS installed could make it more attractive even before the traveler arriving 28 at the VMS location. A strategic traveler, in this case, is one that considers the availability of 29 information in all later decision stages, not just the current one. (12) and (13) verified that a 30 significant portion of subjects made strategic route choices, using PC-and driving-simulator-31 based experiments respectively. However, these studies were static in nature and did not account 32 for experiential or FP information. 33
A main drawback of all the aforementioned individual-based studies is that travel times 34 were usually obtained from underlying probability distributions that were not affected by the 35 travelers' choices. Thus, the inherent link occurring on congested networks (recurring and non-36 recurring) between travelers' route choices and travel times is missing in the current literature. As such, it is the purpose of this paper to overcome some of the drawbacks of previous 1 work by accounting for individual strategic route choices and learning processes and the 2 resulting system-wide outcomes in an experimental setting involving random disturbances and 3 an array of information types: en route real-time, experiential through feedback and FP. To the 4 best of the authors' knowledge, this setup, which provides a conceivably more realistic 5 environment to study route choice behavior under uncertainty, has never been explored before in 6 the travel behavior literature. 7 8
METHODOLOGY 9
Experimental set up and design 10
In this research we adopted the network structure from (12), which allows strategic 11 routing behavior and also provides en route real-time information relating to incidents. A web-12 based non-cooperative interactive route choice experiment was carried out on a congested 13 hypothetical network with occurring random incidents. Figure 1 presents a screen shot of the 14 experiment lay out containing three possible routes from origin to destination, whereby Park 15
Avenue is a stochastic link with random incidents; other links all have deterministic link 16 performance functions. 17
There are in total four scenarios with two control variables, real-time and FP information. 18
The real-time information relates to an incident indicator via a VMS located just before the 19 second branch, which tells drivers whether there is an incident on Park Avenue. This 20 information, however, is not available at any other node and only those passing the VMS are 21 exposed to it. A scenario without the real-time information is named an incident case, while that 22 with the real-time information is named an information case. Note that random incidents exist in 23 any of the cases. The FP information gives travelers the ex post travel times on their non-chosen 24 alternatives after each choice trial, and otherwise, only the chosen alternative's travel time (i.e. 25 experiential information) was given. One session of the experiment consisted of two cases, 26 incident and information, both with FP. Another session of experiment consisted of the incident 27 and information cases under the without (w/o) FP situation. Twelve participants were allocated 28 randomly between the two sessions respectively with six participants each. In both sessions, 29 participants first took the incident case and then information case. Participants took a break and 30 received another round of instructions before a new scenario began to minimize the carryover 31 effect. Each combined experiment consisted of sixty trial days in the incident case followed by 32 sixty trial days in the information case. 33 1
FIGURE 1 Screen shot of Initial Experiment's Presentation 2
Following the recruiting method of (5)(6)(7)(17), which conducted human subject 3 experiments using university students for transportation or economic research, most of our 4 participants were students from the University of Massachusetts Amherst. In our two experiment 5 sessions, there are a total of twelve subjects, including six undergraduates, four graduates, one 6 professor and one from outside of the university. Each had to be at least eighteen years old and 7 hold a valid U.S. driver's license with at least one year of driving experience. Our research is of 8 an exploratory nature that deals with human mental processes, and thus we adopted the common 9 approach in cognitive and behavioral studies where major breakthroughs were generally first 10 made in experiments conducted with university students and later further verified in field studies 11 (21). Future studies involving more diversified population groups are required if conclusions 12 from the exploratory phase are to be generalized to the general population. 13
The payment is $30 for each participant regardless of the performance during the 14 experiment. Our primary goal is to let the subjects apply their real life experience in making the 15 route choices. We try to avoid creating a sense of 'winning' during their trip making as in reality 16 travelers are not competing for monetary rewards. Moreover, Providing a target-based incentive 17 in a non-cooperative like setting with a rather limited amount of participants may induce them to 18 behave competitively trying to maximize personal gains by influencing equilibrium conditions 19 something they would not be doing in reality where the ability of one driver to influence traffic 20 conditions is negligible. Therefore, the fixed payment is a compensation for them to take part in 21 the experiment. Secondly, if performance-based incentives are given, it is implicitly assumed 22 that the same value of time applies to every participant, which is not always the case and might 23 bring unnecessary complications. Moreover, there is no solid proof that people would have the 24 same risk attitude towards monetary gains (or losses) and travel time savings (or losses) and we 25 are cautious in equating these two. Additionally, existing literature reveals (22) that monetary 26 incentives are neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure subjects' cooperativeness, 1 thoughtfulness, or truthfulness. 2 Before experiment, participants were instructed to complete a set of trips from work to 3 home on a day-to-day basis, and informed regarding the characteristic of each road in the 4 network. The free flow travel time on each road was shown on the map and the corresponding 5 congested coefficient was also explained during the instructions, whereby inter-state highways 6 have the lowest congested coefficient, local roads have the largest and the shortcut arterial Park 7
Avenue has the value in between. Participants were informed that incidents could occur on Park 8
Avenue with a probability of 0.25, which may results in significant congestion. However, the 9 exact cost functions were not revealed to them. The numbers in the yellow boxes were the links' 10 actual travel times on the previous day. In day 1, those numbers reflected free flow link travel 11 times. A table provided participants with the previous day's actual route travel times. Note that, 12 in the without FP case, only the information of the route traveled in the last day was shown. 13
Participants were required to make a choice at each of the two nodes by determining which link 14 to take next. Note that at the first step, if I-99 was chosen no other choice was made and the trip 15 was continued by taking Local 2 to the destination. Routes were chosen by clicking the 16 appropriate radio button and then the "submit" button to confirm. At the end of each trial-day, all 17 participants' route choices were recorded and the resulting actual travel time for each alternative 18 route was calculated by plugging the number of choices into the link performance functions. The 19 actual link and route travel times was presented at the beginning of the next day. 20 21
Equilibrium design 22
The link travel time depends on the numbers of participants choosing the link. 23 We use the following notation: We use a routing policy to describe the strategic route choice, which will be manifested 1 as paths under different network conditions. For example, one routing policy (Routing Policy 4) 2 can be defined as: "first take Local 1, and if the incident has occurred, take I-55, otherwise take 3 Park Avenue and then Local 2". It will be manifested as Path 2 under the normal condition and 4
Path 3 under the incident condition. A path can be viewed as a specialized routing policy, e.g., 5
Path 2 can be described as follows: "take 'Local 1' at the origin, and take 'Park Avenue' no 6 matter what the VMS shows". Notwithstanding, such adaptive strategies exist only under the 7 information case. This is because real-time information provided at the second branch allows 8 meaningful route changes, which helps participants update their route choice in response to 9 incident information. However, in the incident case, no such cognitive mechanism exists to 10 improve their choices. Therefore, only three fixed paths are available to a participant. 11
Route choice behavior can be compared to the theoretical results under the assumption of 12 user equilibrium principles. Under the incident case the resulting user equilibrium condition will 13 be generalized as such that all used paths have equal and minimum mean travel times. 
Bootstrap statistical tests 27
Since the decisions of the participants are inherently dependent upon each other, in a 28 sense each scenario provides just observations from one "compound subject" formed by six 29 element subjects. Moreover since the same group participated in both the incident and 30 information cases (i.e. repeated measurements), these are also dependent. These 31 complications restricted us from doing conventional statistical testing using a random 32 sample of subjects (both parametric and nonparametric). 33
Even though there is in a sense only one "compound subject" for each scenario, the 34 observations were obtained from a day-to-day random learning process. In order to draw 35 valid conclusions for the two specific "compound subjects", we need to carry out statistical 36 testing that accounts for the random process over the sixty trial days. Instead of making 37 hypothesis over a random sample of subjects, all of our null hypotheses regarding no-38 difference are between two random processes using bootstrap techniques (23) . These include 39 the following variables: average travel times, route shares and route switches. Bootstrap 40 simulation is an approximate method to derive statistics by re-sampling from the original 41 data -the approximation lies on the fact that the original data is treated as the true empirical 42 distribution. 43
The block bootstrap method is used due to the data dependencies from day to day 1 (20) . Blocks are re-sampled with block lengths having a geometric distribution with a mean 2 of 5, the number of weekdays in a week. We conduct the bootstrap of the time series 10,000 3 times and obtain 10,000 new time series, each with a length of sixty days. We can then 4 calculate the sample average from each bootstrap sample, which can be viewed as one 5 realization of the distribution of the sample average. The p-value for a null hypothesis of 6 equal mean between the two random processes can be obtained by counting the frequency at 7 which the difference between each pair of sample average realizations from the two random 8 processes is greater than or equal to the difference between the original sample averages. 9
Note that the "compound subject" remained intact and the re-sampling applied only to the 10 day-to-day process. 11
12
RESULTS
13
Route Shares 14 Table 1 summarizes the average route shares over the first and second thirty-day period 15 and all sixty days respectively, in each of the four scenarios. It can be seen that none of the 16 scenarios reached the theoretical equilibrium within the span of sixty days. Note that, the 17 equilibriums here refer to those we calculated in the equilibrium design, which are based on a 18 simplified traffic assignment model by assuming a minimum and equal mean travel time on each 19 used path/routing policy. Route shares in the information case with FP, are the closest to the 20 equilibrium pattern, and comparing the first and last thirty trials, we can also observe that route 21 shares are approaching the network equilibrium. This is because the information case with FP 22 has the lowest level of uncertainty among all scenarios, which makes it easier to get to the 23 equilibrium. Based on our previous assumptions, the equilibriums in the incident and information 24 cases are quite different, as there are only three paths in the incident case, compared to five 25 routing policies in the information case where real-time information is provided at the branch 26 allowing for a detour from prospective incidents. Such incident information does in fact affect 27 the individual behavior pattern, where more participants tend to choose the stochastic branch at 28 the origin node and the stochastic shortcut at the intermediate node in the information case than 29 in the incident case, regardless of FP, which indicates that travelers would take strategic 30 responses to the information en route. 
TABLE 2 Bootstrap Statistic Test Results 3
As for the impacts of FP, average route shares with FP are closer to the designed 4 equilibrium than those without FP, in both incident and information cases, which indicates that 5 providing FP helps push the network towards user equilibrium to some extent. However, for the 6 information scenario, participants in the FP case seem to be more risk-seeking than those in the 7 without FP sessions whereby more people choose the stochastic shortcut through Park Avenue. 8
Participants in the without FP group are more inclined to choose Path 1, which is the 9 deterministic route. According to the bootstrap statistical test, there is a significant difference 10 between the average route shares with and without FP at the origin at the level of 1% (one-11 sided). Moreover, the percentage of participants at the intermediate node who choose the 12 deterministic detour is also higher in the without FP cases than with FP. The bootstrap statistic 13 result shows a significant difference at the level of 5% (one sided). This can be explained that 14 without FP, participants become more sensitive when stuck in traffic, whereas the deterministic 15 route/detour is not too bad. Thus providing travel time information on all alternative routes could 16 potentially motivate more competition and risk-seeking behavior as suggested by (5,6). 17
Conversely, no such observation exists in the incident scenario. The bootstrap test fails to find a 18 significant difference in the shares at origin and intermediate node between the case with and 19 without FP. This may be due to the increase in the level of uncertainty, which may offset the 20 impact of FP. 21
To find out how the network system performs over time, we plot in Figures 2 the average 22 route shares for every five trials at the origin and intermediate nodes in both incident and 23 information cases respectively. In Figure 2 (1), shares are more stable over time with FP than 24 without FP in the incident case. This is probably related to an expedited learning rate with a 25 complete feedback on all possible alternatives. The same trend can be observed in Figure 2 have larger volatility in the incident cases than in the information cases. This result indicates that 12 real-time incident information increases the efficiency and reliability of the network's 13 performance. We also employed the bootstrap statistics to check the significance of average 14 travel time differences when providing incident information. In both with and without FP cases, 1 both differences are significant at the level of 1% (one-sided). Although in our designed user 2 equilibrium, the difference of mean travel times between the incident and information cases was 3 relatively small, with approximately 2.5 minutes difference, the actual observed difference is 4 much larger -19.16 (with FP) and 12.6 (without FP) minutes respectively. In our cases, the 5 benefit that real-time information contributes to the network seems to be quite significant. It also 6 seems that without complete feedbacks, travel time is even lower under information cases. The 7 difference between the travel times with and without FP is significant at the level of 5% (one-8 sided) under real-time information cases. This can be explained as a result of the higher tendency 9
to take the stochastic route in the FP group (more risk seeking). It also suggests that it may not 10 always be advisable to provide full feedbacks on non-chosen alternatives. 11 In Figure 4 (a), in the incident scenarios the number of switches with FP is higher than 4 that of without FP at the origin node, with the difference significant at the level of 5% (one-5 sided) from the bootstrap statistical test. This is because participants with FP may experience two 6 situations; first -if no incident happens, travel time on Park Avenue is much lower than the other 7 two alternatives; second -if there is an incident and most participants choose the stochastic 8 branch, the deterministic route (I-99 -Local 2) has the least travel time. Without an incident 9 indictor assisting in making strategic choices, participants have to take their decision at the origin 10 and stick to it. For participants with neither information nor FP, if they find that the deterministic 11 route is acceptable, they tend to avoid unnecessary risk given that congestion is quite significant 12 when an incident occurs. This result is similar to those from previous studies relating to 13 individual choices (e.g., 6) that the lack of information increases risk-averse behavior. 14 However, under the information scenario in Figure 4 (c) the trend is opposite, whereby 15 with FP provided, participants tend to switch less than without FP at the origin. This has also 16 been verified by a p-value of 0%. This is because real-time information at the branch allows 17 participants to make adaptive route choices to avoid the incident. When FP is provided, they 18 realize that choosing the branch also turns out to be an optimal decision. The impact of FP on 19 switching behavior is more significant at the origin than at the intermediate node, where incident 20 information has the decisive effect. In our experiments, the four scenarios stand for four 21 uncertainty levels. Participants tend to switch less in the two extreme conditions, when the 22 uncertainty level is either very low (with information and FP) or significantly high (without 23 information and without FP). Under the former condition, the situation becomes pretty clear, so 24 switching is unnecessary once participants learn which alternative is the optimal one. However, 25 in the latter condition, switches are avoided because very little feedback is provided, learning is 26 more difficult and participants tend to avoid unnecessary risks. The latter follows the predictions 27 of the payoff variability effect. 28
Finally, in Figure 5 we present the number of switches in each trial rather than an average 1 over five trials for the information case. It can been seen that, regardless of the FP, most 2 participants respond and take advantage of the information provided at the intermediate node, 3 which indicates that strategic behavior (Routing Policy 4) has been widely adopted in the 4 information case. 5 6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 7 In this paper, experimental observations of a day-to-day traffic pattern evolution are 8 obtained in a simple congested network under exogenous disruptions with a given probability 9 distribution. The effects of en route real-time traveler information and ex post FP information are 10 assessed by comparing traffic patterns in the presence of uncertain disruptions. The comparison 11 is in route flows, total system travel time, and the numbers of switches. Due to the limited 12 number of experiment sessions and the small number of participants in each session, preliminary 13 results and bootstrap statistics are provided in this paper. The hypotheses are between two 14 random processes rather than over a random sample of subjects. Bootstrap statistical analysis 15 sheds some light on the trends of the route choice random process over sixty 'days'. Based on the 16 1000 Bootstrap resampling samples, it is valid to draw statistical conclusions between two 17 random processes. 18
It is observed that en route real-time information leads to travel time savings. Providing FP 19 information makes the route flows closer to the user equilibrium pattern. However, this seems to 20 cause network travel time to increase and bootstrap statistics verify the trend in the information 21 case (but not in the incident case). The least network travel time is obtained under the scenario 22 'with en route information and without FP'. Therefore, travel time saving also depend to a 23 certain extent on the network's design. This adds to the empirical evidences that more 24 information in not necessarily better in a congested network. Route shares at the origin show 25 significant differences between with and without real-time information, which indicate that 26 travelers would plan in advance for the future availability of a VMS system. Last but not least, it 27
shows that participants in with FP scenarios are more risk seeking than those in without FP 28 scenarios regardless of information provision. FP information encourages route switching 29 without real-time information, but suppresses them with real-time information. 30
We are now conducting more experiment sessions with a larger sample size so that 31 statistical tests over the subject population can also be carried out. 
